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Recreational Zoning: Concept Used in Inappropriate Context Raises
Troubling Issues
Written for Publication in the New York Law Journal
Dec. 17, 1997
By John R. Nolon
[John R. Nolon is the Charles A. Frueauff Research Professor at Pace University
School of Law, the Director of its Land Use Law Center and a recent Fulbright
Scholar in Latin America.]
Abstract: The Second Department Appellate Division’s holding in Bonnie Briar
Syndicate, Inc. v. Mamaroneck upheld local rezoning in Mamaroneck, New York,
from residential to recreational use despite legal challenges that the zoning
change constituted an unreasonable use of municipal police power as well as a
regulatory taking. The case cited several New York precedents. Each held that
so long as rezoning is in accordance with the local comprehensive plan, the
zoning shall be held constitutional. However, concerns linger among private
residents and local municipalities regarding recreational rezoning projects, which
despite providing significant benefits for the community, must be justified by a
local comprehensive plan.
***
Recreational zoning is a novel concept. It was upheld in Bonnie Briar
Syndicate, Inc. v. Mamaroneck, a recent Second Department Appellate Division
case (661 NYS2d 1005). The plaintiff alleged that the rezoning of its land from
residential to recreational use was an unreasonable exercise of the police power
and a regulatory taking. The success of the case to date has led some to
advocate recreational zoning as a means of preventing residential or commercial
development of critical parcels of land in quite different contexts. Although the
Appellate Division upheld a carefully reasoned Supreme Court decision (N.Y.
Law Journal, July 19, 1997), the concept raises troubling issues if applied
inappropriately in other situations.
In Bonnie Briar, the Town of Mamaroneck rezoned three parcels of land
consisting of 428 acres from R-30, allowing single family home construction on
30,000 square foot lots, to R, a recreational zoning district. The new district
limited principal permitted uses to private recreation facilities, such as country
clubs, golf courses, fitness centers, riding stables, and tennis and swimming
clubs. The recreational district includes lands owned by three private country
clubs, including one operated by Bonnie Briar Country Club, Inc. on land owned
by the plaintiff, the Bonnie Briar Syndicate, Inc. The plaintiff’s land consists of
141 acres that have been used continuously as a country club since 1921, prior
to the adoption of the town’s first zoning ordinance. Among other features, the
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land contains scenic vistas, rock outcroppings, and wetlands and is within a
critical flood plain of the town, which is situated on Long Island Sound whose
environmental problems abound.
Prior to the rezoning, the Town adopted an extensive Local Waterfront
Revitalization Plan. Pursuant to the plan, the Town adopted a number of
measures including the challenged rezoning to prevent siltation, pollution and
flooding. Additional objectives of the rezoning were to maintain “important open
space and recreational resources” and “the suburban quality of the community as
a whole.” The plaintiff had proposed a tightly clustered subdivision of 71 homes,
preserving 112 acres for open space and the continuation of the golf course.
Plaintiff argued that its proposed development, which was denied as not
permitted under the new zoning, was consistent with the objectives of the Local
Waterfront Revitalization Plan.
The plaintiff claimed that the rezoning constituted an unconstitutional taking of
its property. It argued that the amendment failed to substantially advance a
legitimate public purpose, did not bear a close causal nexus with such a purpose,
and that its restrictions are not roughly proportional to the impacts which might
have resulted from the property’s development. The plaintiff also claimed that its
property was unduly singled out to bear a public burden under the guise of
regulation that takes away the use for which the property is reasonably adapted.
Judge Leavitt, writing for the Supreme Court in Westchester County, rejected
these claims and, in doing so, presented a useful framework for applying
regulatory takings law. He placed these facts within stable core of takings
jurisprudence which involves regulations that apply generally throughout the
community such as a zoning ordinance and its amendments, as in the instant
case. Within this core, a number of settled principles apply. First, the regulations
are presumed to be constitutional. Second, to overcome this presumption, the
plaintiff must carry a heavy burden of proof requiring a demonstration that the
regulation is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. Third, this burden is
not carried when the plaintiff shows that the regulation has caused a significant
diminution in the property’s value or that a substantially higher value could be
obtained if an alternate use were permitted. Fourth, to carry its burden, the
plaintiff must show that the land cannot yield an economically reasonable return
under any use allowed by the zoning. Ironically, the population growth in the
Mamaroneck area due to the residential development of other land has created
significant demand among relatively affluent people for the type of private
recreational uses allowed by the recreational zone.
A principal claim of the plaintiff in Bonnie Briar was that the recreational
zoning amendment was unreasonable because less restrictive means were
available to accomplish the objectives sought. Without restricting the plaintiff’s
right to build single family homes, the Town could have required a tightly
clustered subdivision of the type proposed by the plaintiff. The court puts this
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argument to rest, citing Tilles Investment Company v. Huntington (528 NYS2d
386 (2nd Dept 1988)) for the proposition that “the Town was not required to
explore or utilize alternative measures which would place less restrictions on the
possible uses to which plaintiff’s property might be put.” To act otherwise would
put the court in the position of second guessing the discretionary judgments of
the local legislature. This is anathema to judges and why they cloak regulatory
actions with a presumption of validity.
In rejecting the application of three much-trumpeted takings tests articulated
by the U.S. Supreme Court and urged by the plaintiff, Judge Leavitt noted simply
that they apply in an entirely different context of cases. The plaintiff argued that
Mamaroneck’s recreational zoning failed to pass the essential nexus, rough
proportionality and individualized determination tests created by the Supreme
Court in the 1987 Nollan (483 U.S. 825) and 1994 Dolan (512 U.S. 374) cases.
These tests are reserved for situations where the government imposes an
exaction, such as an affirmative easement, on the subject land in exchange for a
development permit or otherwise disturbs the fundamental rights of owners to
exclude others or to lease, dispose of or manage their properties. In these cases,
the court applies a higher level of scrutiny, curious as to whether property rights
are being taken as a regulatory shortcut to acquiring them by eminent domain
and paying just compensation.
To guide its curiosity in reviewing regulatory exactions of this kind, the court
requires an essential nexus between the regulation and the public purpose
served by the regulation. It further requires some rough proportionality between
the burden imposed on the property by the regulation and the negative impact its
proposed development would have on the public.
Some individualized
determination, or study, of the impacts from this particular project is required. In
Grogan v. Zoning Board of Appeals (633 NYS2d 819 (2nd Dept 1995)) these tests
were applied to the imposition of a scenic and conservation easement on an
individual parcel of land. The court noted that, in this context, the agency had a
burden of demonstrating the required rough proportionality. By carefully
explaining that these tests are not used to determine the validity of generally
applicable zoning provisions, Judge Leavitt’s decision may help to quiet the
concerns raised by commentators and practitioners who generalize too broadly
about the applicability of these recently articulated tests.
The plaintiff cited Vernon Park Realty, Inc. v. Mount Vernon (307 NY 493
(1954)) for the proposition that its land was unduly singled out to bear a burden
that should be borne by the public as a whole. In that case, a two acre parcel
situated across the street from a commuter train station was zoned exclusively
for parking. The purpose of the zoning was to ease traffic congestion and
improve parking conditions for the benefit of the community as a whole: a valid
public purpose. The Court of Appeals found, however, that this regulation
constituted an “undue and uncompensated burden on the individual owner of a
single parcel of land in the guise of regulation….” It has long been established
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that regulations may not be used as a means of carrying out an enterprise that
the government is authorized to pursue through the exercise of its power of
eminent domain which includes condemning land for parking. This singling out of
a small parcel was deemed to be “so unreasonable and arbitrary as to constitute
an invasion of property rights, contrary to constitutional due process….”
Another example of singling out a small parcel that was found to be
unreasonable and void is found in Stevens v. Huntington (20 NY 2d 352 (1967)).
In Stevens, the residential zoning of a one-acre tract of land located on a corner
of a heavily traveled artery in a highly commercial shopping area was found to be
an unconstitutional taking. Although there was no government enterprise
furthered in this case, the court found that the property “is so totally unadaptable
for residential use that the existing ordinance amounts practically to confiscation.”
The court in Bonnie Briar points out that, absent one of these special
circumstances, there is nothing necessarily unconstitutional about singling out
individual parcels for special regulation, citing several New York precedents. The
test, in each case, is whether the regulation accomplishes the purposes of the
community’s comprehensive plan. The recreational zone in Mamaroneck passes
that test since it was adopted to protect the flood plain, maintain open space and
preserve the suburban quality of the community.
Other Applications
As the U. S. Supreme Court noted in Goldblatt v. Hempstead (369 U.S. 590
(1962)), “[T]his court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any set formula
for determining when justice and fairness require that economic injuries caused
by public action be compensated by the Government, rather than remain
disproportionately concentrated on a few persons.” This is cautionary language.
Regulators who are tempted to zone critically situated parcels for recreational
use must study carefully the basis used by Judge Leavitt to sustain it in the
Bonnie Briar context. What if the land were not located in a critical flood plain and
did not contain wetlands and other environmental constraints? What if the
zoning only applied to a single parcel, owned by one individual ? What if the
objective of the recreational zoning were to create a park or other public place: a
government enterprise? What if the land had not been used profitably for a
private recreational use for over seven decades? What if the recreational uses
allowed were too few or too limited to create a meaningful economic opportunity
for the property owner? What if the demand for the recreational development
allowed were weak in the vicinity of the land affected?
Three communities in the northern suburbs in the New York metropolitan area
are debating open space and recreational zoning in contexts quite different from
Mamaroneck’s. In one village, a 55 acre parcel which had been used as an old
age home, situated on rugged terrain, was zoned as a
Preservation
Development District. The principal uses permitted in this district were limited to
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public parks, playgrounds or similar recreational areas; natural open space areas
and uses designed for environmental or ecological preservation; and public
buildings or uses operated by the village itself. By special permit, the district
allowed the development of golf courses and country clubs, public utility facilities
and cemeteries. The village comprehensive plan study calls the site “an
unusually fine recreational asset for the Village” and proposes that it be used as
a “park.” The 55 acre parcel is not suited for golf course development, leaving
only quasi-public uses of doubtful economic value. Under the pressures of
litigation, the village rezoned the area for low density, residential development
designed to protect the natural environment. Still open for resolution is whether
the village is liable for damages for a temporary taking under First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church (482 U.S. 304, 1987) during the time the
Preservation Development District was in existence.
In another community, a proposal has been made to zone a single,
individually owned 160 acre parcel exclusively for open space and park uses. In
another, a large relatively unconstrained parcel that has been proposed for
condominium development is being considered for recreational zoning of the type
adopted in the Town of Mamaroneck which prohibits residential use. This parcel
is not severely constrained environmentally, is not located in a critical flood plain,
and has not been used profitably as a private recreational facility. It is not
situated next to two other large properties regulated in the same way and it is not
the only property of its type in the community. The differences that these
changes in context make regarding the validity of recreational zoning will be
explored and, undoubtedly, litigated as the future of this novel land use technique
unfolds in New York.

5

